The Effects of Crime Incident Characteristics and Neighborhood Structure on

Police Response Time

by

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ABSTRACT

Effectiveness and efficiency of the police have both been contentious topics from the public perspective.  Police departments have developed policies to help better their patrol officers' effectiveness on the streets in both quality and timeliness.  Although there have been few recent studies about the response time of officers to calls for service, this is a subject that should not go overlooked.  As an important aspect to the patrol officer’s repertoire, response time can have effects on the community and their perception on the police.  This study uses a multi-level modeling approach to examine the effects of incident and neighborhood factors on police response time within a medium size Southwest Region Police Department, Chandler PD. Police departments use a scale to determine the priority of a call for service, commonly referred to as the PRI. This index scale was found to have the most effect on the response times, while a few cyclical patterns were obtained of level 1 variables. No significant effects were found by any level two variables, measuring structural disadvantage, however, caution should be used in generalizing these findings to other public jurisdictions.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

LIST OF TABLES……………………..………………………………..….…….iv

LIST OF FIGURES…………………..…………………………….…… ……….v

INTRODUCTION………………………………………………………………...1

BACKGROUND LITERATURE…………………………………………..……..3

 Police Response ………..…………………………………………………3

 Department Perception……………………...……………………………11

 Neighborhood Characteristics………………...………………………….16

 Disadvantaged Neighborhoods………..…………………………17

 Neighborhood Organization and Culture……………….………..18

 Collective Efficacy……………………………………………….20

 Neighborhood Disorder………………………………...………..21

 Crime Victimization……………………………………………………..23

 Peers within Disadvantaged Neighborhoods…………………………….24

“Underworld” Parameters……………………………...………………...26

RESEARCH QUESTIONS……………………………………………………...33

RESEARCH DESIGN..………………………………………………………….34

 Data Collection……..............……………………………………………34

 Dependent Measure……………………………………………………...35

 Independent Variables………………………………………………….37

 Categorical……………………………………………………….37

 Priority Assignment of Calls Definition 38

Page

 Neighborhood Characteristics……………………………………43

RESULTS………………………………………………………………………..45

 Level 1 Variables………………………………………………………...46

 Level 2 Variables………………………………………………………...51

DISCUSSION……………………………………………………………………52

 Practical Implications…………...………………………………………..52

 Future Theoretical Research ….…………………………………………55

 Conclusion……………….........................................................................57

LIST OF TABLES

Table Page

1. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF RESPONSE TIME AND NEIGHBORHOOD CHARACTERISTICS……………..………………37

2. DEPARTMENT-LEVEL AND TRACT-LEVEL REGRESSION

OF POLICE RESPONSE TIME...........………………………………….45

3. ACTUAL LOGGED IN PATROL UNITS - AVERAGE PER

DAY OF WEEK/HOUR OF DAY………………………………………54

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure Page

1. Descriptive Statistics Incident Occurrence ……………………….…….47

2. Descriptive Statistics Violent vs NonViolent.……………….………….50

**INTRODUCTION**

Only a small number of studies have examined police response time for calls for service, and this research focuses primarily on incident characteristics, not neighborhood structural factors.  This is an area that has been overlooked for years but potentially holds a key to understanding any agency's efficiency of their mission statements.  Patrol officers are the first responders to any crime that has been reported or witnessed by the officer.  This makes their timeliness to those calls for service top priority in terms of patrol protocol.  There may be numerous departmental factors that can affect response time outcomes, number of officers on duty, number of patrol units on duty, as well as one or two-officer patrol units. Social and physical factors may also play important roles in the outcomes of police response time. External physical factors such as city and neighborhood design, the structure of the roads (pot holes, construction, etc.), location of the call for service and current location of responding officer can all have an effect on the police response time. There is also the presence of external social factors that can affect police response time (amount of traffic, volume of calls for service during that shift, minority concentration, and structural disadvantage).

This study found that the time-lapse of the incident and when the incident was called in, had a strong effect on the response time of officers. Whether the incident was violent also had a very strong effect on police response time. The study also found that whether an incident was reported to the police on a weekday or weekend had a strong effect on response time. The type of incident (felony, misdemeanor, disorder), had a strong effect on police response time, indicating the use of discretion as a tool for incident response. Both the volume of calls for each shift on each particular day, as well as whether the call for service was within a “hot spot” in the city, had significant effect on the police response time. This study found that, holding the police department’s priority response index constant and all other external factors, structural disadvantage had a small, but significant effect on police response time. This is an important finding as it leaves room for many theories as to why structural disadvantage of a neighborhood will have a significant effect on police response time. From a departmental view, these neighborhoods may be looked at as dangerous and backup may be required on certain calls for service, resulting in a increase in response time. Perhaps there are more calls for service within these densely populated neighborhoods, resulting in longer queue times and creating longer police response times. From an internal view, there might be more crime and disorder within these structurally disadvantaged neighborhoods which would see an increase in calls for service and cause longer police response times. These neighborhoods tend to have more apartments, which can result in longer response times if the apartments are gated or have a physical layout more complicated than that of a residential home.

The public service role of the police is to protect and serve the citizens of their community. Effectiveness and efficiency of the police are transparent through the cooperation of officers and the community. While we know how incident characteristics – priority of a call for service – affect response time, we still know little about how neighborhood structure affects it. The focus of this thesis is to understand police effectiveness using the priority of a call for service and taking it further to use the neighborhood structure of those calls for service. Police effectiveness is operationalized by response time to calls for service. We may then be able to draw upon the data to develop any relationship between neighborhood structure and police response time. In doing so, we might be able to further understand how neighborhood structure affects police response time.

**BACKGROUND LITERATURE**

**Police Response**

The landmark, Response Time Analysis: Executive Summary, was conducted in Kansas City, MO in 1977. This experiment was the first of its kind, and has remained a seminal piece, as there has not been a very strong focus of police response time. Prior to the Response Time Analysis, the understanding of police response time was “first, that visible police presence prevents crime by deterring potential offenders; second, that the public’s fear of crime is diminished by such police presence” (Kelling, 1974; 1978). This assumption implied that the amount of police patrolling the streets would directly affect the amount of crime in the community. A side effect of both the increase in preventative patrol and decrease in criminal activity would create shorter response times. What Kelling found was that decreasing or increasing routine preventative patrol in the experiment had no impact on clearance rates (crimes solved) (Kelling, 1978), no effect on crime, citizen fear of crime, community attitudes toward the police on delivery of police service, police response time or traffic accidents (Kelling, 1974). While these experiments proved to be paramount in understanding a multitude of ways that police patrols can be enhanced, it found that proactive levels of patrol had little to no effect on crime, compared to reactive patrol.

The notion of noncommitted time was suggested through the analysis and conclusions of Kelling’s work. He defined noncommitted time as, “time available for answering calls for service” (Kelling, 1974; 1978). During this time, officers could be classified into three different categories: “stationary, mobile, and contacting personnel in the field” (Kelling, 1974; 1978). Each of these categories was then differentiated between police-related and nonpolice-related activities. What he found was that police often used their noncommitted time to engage equally in both police and non-police related activities. This means that much of their time was dedicated to order maintenance and non-crime related issues.

What this experiment meant for routine preventative patrol was not that it is ineffective nor that an increase of patrol officers on duty will show a decrease in criminal activity. Rather, departments should look into more constructive and instrumental activities for officers to spend their noncommitted time while on patrol. If officers could use their noncommitted time more efficiently, then there is potential to increase effectiveness of preventive patrols in dealing with criminal activity. This ties together with police response times, as certain noncommitted time police actions will directly result in varying response times to calls for service. If officers are engaging in more behaviors that are “mobile” and involve “contacting personnel in the field,” response time may be able to be decreased. Kelling found that officers are engaging in crime-related and noncrime-related behavior during their noncommitted time, roughly at even amounts. Police patrol officers assigned to the reactive beats tended to spend more of their noncommitted time on non-police related mobile and stationary activities (e.g., eating, resting, girl watching, personal phone calls, driving to relieve boredom, pleasure riding) than did their proactive and control counterparts. Encouraging officers to spend less time engaging in nonpolice-related behaviors and more time engaging in police-related behaviors, response time may be affected in a positive way. While there are most certainly internal factors within the department that can affect response time, there are many external, neighborhood factors that may also affect response time.

Disorder then, is a condition resulting from a behavior that, depending on location, time, and local traditions, is offensive in its violation of local expectations for normalcy and peace in a community. Whether malevolent or innocent in intent, disorderly behavior powerfully shapes the quality of urban life and citizens’ views both of their own safety and the ability of the government to ensure it (Kelling, 1987). Kelling’s definition of disorder will have an influential role in relation to the outcome of this study. While it is each community that defines what disorder is to them, the variation in definitions should have some effect on the response times for officers for calls for service. Many crimes go unreported as individuals in certain neighborhoods may deem specific behavior acceptable, while it is deemed disorderly in other neighborhoods or they may have less trust in the police department’s ability to resolve those problems. This can result in an influx of specific calls for service in a neighborhood, which will then affect an officer’s attitude toward that call (See Klinger, 1997).

While serious crime is a common problem in many neighborhoods, often residents are troubled by less serious problems, such as chronic and demoralizing public disorder (Kelling, 1987). This has presented itself as a major issue for police agencies, as the majority of departments have not routinely collected data about chronic disorder nor citizens’ response to it. Without such data collection and allocation of time and resources, departments may not place sufficient emphasis on tactics that combat these quality of life problems. This can leave neighborhoods with a sense of alienation from the police and an absence of trust and legitimacy as residents are left to their own devices. In turn, this can then result in serious crimes with delayed report times; some never get reported due to the police-citizen mistrust. This problem is only exacerbated by the fact that patrol units in vehicles are increasingly isolated from the very communities they are entrusted to serve.

While these neighborhoods have seen an increase in public disorder, public political awareness has been growing and spreading, to help provide their neighborhoods with security and structure (Kelling, 1987). This has resulted in more neighborhood-police collaboration and stronger citizen-police relations. When the neighborhoods demand police action of a certain type, under the community policing model, departments will begin to shift policy and priorities to conform to those demands. As departments develop policies and tactics in collaboration with the broader community, preventive expectations and goals will progress accordingly.

At the beginning of the focus on policing within criminological studies, scholars theorized both macro-level and micro-level theories that required actions and behaviors by both individual officers and departments alike. George Kelling was one of the most profound policing scholars who used that focus on policing to understand the profession, the people who work in it, and the people who are affected by it. As the decades passed, so did the role of the police. Kelling studied not only the changing role of police, but he also studied the changing social conditions as a determinant of how the role of the police will develop. He theorized that there was a developing trend in the role of the police. He asserted that rapid response to calls for service and an emerging omnipresence of patrol units throughout the neighborhoods would dramatically and effectively reduce crime (Kelling, 1978). This was not to replace the importance and necessity of civilian-police interaction at a close and personal level, as Wilson had emphatically stressed (Wilson, 1953). The new trend was to place a large emphasis on the constant movement of officers within their vehicles, rather than directly engaging with citizens in their beats. This idea stemmed from the belief that the role of the police was to apprehend criminal rather than maintain order and safety of communities and citizens. Police were now classified as “in-service” while driving in their vehicles and, conversely, classified as “out-of-service” while outside of their vehicles and directly engaging with both citizens and offenders (Larson, 1972). What Kelling wanted to emphasize was that the developing role of preventative patrol was not a wrong direction. This was also not to be a replacement for old fashioned citizen-police personal contact, where information is exchanged, trust established, and problems are identified. This is where criticism was strongest, the failure of preventive patrol as an effective tool to reduce crime.

Citizen approval of police did not reside with, or was contingent upon, police response times, rather, their approval rating resided with citizen expectations of response times (Kelling, 1978). It was the combined effects of the dispatcher, officer, and type of incident that would determine both the expectations and actual response times of officers. Response time became a political tool used by both agencies and critics, as an indicator of police effectiveness (Kelling, 1978)

Preventive patrol involves officers assigned to vehicles (patrol units), driving through pre-assigned beats to observe any disorder or deviation from normalcy. While on preventive patrol, units are available to respond to various calls for service as per requested. Kaplan found that response times may be affected by one-officer versus two-officer patrol units in multiple ways (Kaplan, 1979). While his study did not focus on the role of backup and the necessity for such a situation, it illustrates costs and benefits to both one-officer and two-officer patrol units. “Response delays” are less frequent with more one-officer units than with less two-officer units (Kaplan, 1978). What this means is that, while two-officer units conducted calls at a faster rate, there are fewer total units in the field which results in a longer delay from call to call. One-officer units conduct calls at a longer rate, however, because there are roughly twice as many total units, the response delay to future calls and calls in queue are more likely to be available to an open unit. While the actual response time to calls for service is not directly affected by number or officers per patrol vehicle, it is indirectly affected through “response delay” from available units to take various calls for service in queue.

Only a small number of studies have examined police response times for calls for service, and this research focuses primarily on incident characteristics, not neighborhood structural factors.  This is an area that has been overlooked for years but potentially holds a key to understanding any agency's efficiency of their mission statements.  Patrol officers are the first responders to any crime that has been reported or witnessed by the officer.  This makes their timeliness to those calls for service top priority in terms of patrol protocol.  Not only can research help create a more efficient response time within an agency, it can potentially streamline their calls for service to reduce both misuse of manpower and the cost of systems based for calls for service.  The majority of previous literature on police response time comes from public surveys about the police and their satisfaction with response times. For example, Percy found that the majority of people do believe that police response is acceptable with a 76 percent satisfaction rate among victims (Percy, 1980). Several studies took a different approach and strictly focused on the police response system and its function as an algorithm (See Larson, 1967; Bertram & Vargo, 1976). In a 1989 study, the San Francisco Police Department (SFPD) implemented an optimization-based decision support system for deploying patrol officers. This system would forecast hourly needs, schedule officers to maximize coverage, and allow fine tuning to meet human needs. The fine-tuning mode would help captains evaluate schedule changes and suggest alternatives. The system would also evaluate policy options for strategic deployment. The integer search procedure generated solutions that made 25 percent more patrol units available in times of need, equivalent to adding 200 officers to the force or a savings of $11 million per year. As a result, response times improved 20 percent, while revenues from traffic citations increased by $3 million per year (Taylor & Huxley, 1989).  A necessary piece to understanding response time and what factors have effects on it comes from an ecological standpoint. One study discussed the implications of the theory for understanding how police behavior varies across physical space and how crime patterns develop and are sustained in local communities (Klinger, 1997).

The 1960s proved to be a decade fixated with social scientific review on the police and police strategies. Primary research has delved into immediate implications of police-citizen relationships and encounters, citizens’ actions and approval, as well as, the police organizations themselves (Black and Reiss, 1970; Lundman, 1974; Smith, 1987; Brown, 1981; Wilson, 1968). A few studies have considered the possibility that police action might vary across urban neighborhoods (Slovak, 1987; Smith 1986; Klinger, 1997). Research by Klinger provided the research community with a new theory about officer behavior and discretion within varying neighborhoods and characteristics. His theoretical framework sought to specify how the ecological and organizational structures of policing frame work group negotiations, while providing a framework for understanding spatial variation in dimensions of police action that it does not explicitly address the amount of time officers devote to incidents, and the degree to which officers observe the due process rights of citizens (Klinger, 1997). He also touched on the notion that some literature noted that police officers’ ideas about normal crime and victim deservedness may vary with sub district variation in deviance (Rubinstein, 1973; Waegel, 1981). While this work did not examine how ecological variables impacted response time specifically, it is still important to understand police efficiency from a broad perspective.

What Klinger found may have an effect on police response times within certain districts. As he had previously found, officers’ attitudes toward varying neighborhoods within their beats are reflected by their ideas of what normal crime is like and the extent of victim deservedness per individual. If such an effect is to be found, this research can be informative in addressing possible improvements for officer oversight of varying neighborhoods with known crime rates and victim deservedness. While this is not the only factor in understanding officer response times, this approach may provide a strong foundation for improvements to current response numbers.

**Department Perception**

Both the role and direction of police departments and the police as a whole, have evolved through the years of United States history. Beginning from the 1840’s, this era of police strategy falls under the Political Era, due to the police’s close ties with politics and politicians of the time. The 1930’s provided a time to distance many governmental departments from politics all together. This, the Reform Era, lasted until the 1970’s where a reaction to the politics of the prior era was developed to increase efficacy of the police. Present day policing falls under the Community Era, sparked in reaction from the Reform Era (Kelling & Moore, 1988). This focus on community problem solving began in the 1970’s and is currently the strategy and direction in which police are taking. The police are focused on maintaining order, peacekeeping, meeting community needs, crime control and resolving disputes (Kelling & Moore, 1988). Response time has evolved to be a large indicator of police effectiveness, as seen by citizens. Throughout the three reforms, the organizational design of the police has evolved from decentralized departments during the Political era, to centralized bureaucratic organizations during the Reform era, back to decentralized, generalist departments of today’s Community era. Contributing to the creation of these flaws, the function of the police carries the departments into roles where they cannot produce the desired outcomes demanded by the external relationships of the police (Bittner, 1967).

The Community era has resulted in various outcomes by which the police conduct performance. Citizens, scholars, media and the departments themselves, uphold the police to maintain order, carry out peacekeeping, meet community needs, perform crime control methods, and resolve disputes at various levels of society (Kelling & Moore, 1988). However, the performance of the police is measured by different standards. “The good pinch” is how citizens and departments alike, measure the performance of the police (Bittner, 1967). The role of the police has been of a professional “crime fighter,” weighing the effectiveness of the “good pinch” and crime fighting techniques. Within this role as a professional crime fighter, many issues are associated that effect both the police and the citizens they serve. There is a stark over-emphasis on the crime-fighting persona of a police officer, which has been structured over the years. Beginning with the reform era, the police departments wanted to change their ideals and infrastructure to ensure corruption could be eradicated (Kelling & Moore, 1988). They focused the majority of their attention and efforts to become more of a crime-fighting profession. In doing so, the police departments neglected many important issues that are necessary of the role of the police. As a crime-fighter, the police are restricted to reactionary policing. In order to fight crime, they must first wait for crime to occur, react to the crime, and “fight” it. This style of policing has some major issues because it simply does not address the root of the problem. This style will only react to past events, it will not prevent future crime, nor will it ever address the roots of any problems; be they social, ecological or physical.

In order to cope with these various roles, the policeman develops a perceptual shorthand to identify certain kinds of people (Skolnick, 1966). These people are identified as “symbolic assailants, that is, as persons who use gesture, language, and attire that the policeman has come to recognize as a prelude to violence” (Skolnick, 1966). A policeman’s job, especially that of a patrolman, requires split second choices and quick reaction times. In order to minimize reaction time and build routine upon visuals, the policeman must use these perceptual shorthands to effectively and efficiently carry out his/her job. In doing so, the policeman is able to create comparisons to minimize reaction time. This makes them suspicious of all activity. “It is the nature of the policeman’s situation that his conception of order emphasizes regularity and predictability” (Skolnick, 1966). With this, the policeman establishes the standard deviation of “normal,” and in turn, is able to minimize his/her reaction time for preconceived choices. The use of perceptual shorthands leads into the ability to use and manage discretionary skills.

Popular television shows, movies and novels depict the police officer as a young and clever individual. They create the image that an officer’s job is constantly exciting, full of adrenaline and always presenting different challenges. This image has been portrayed for numerous decades and aids in the over-emphasis on crime-fighting role of law enforcement. A subculture has evolved from the lasting image of what a police officer ought to be (Skolnick, 1966: Strecher, 1971). The police subculture is one that is marginally disassociated with its surroundings. The “us vs. them” mentality is both accepted and strengthened on both sides (Strecher, 1971: Van Maanen, 1978: Manning, 1992). Strecher explains the police subculture as a product of the very nature of the job description. He likens the police officer to that of a soldier, school-teacher and an industrial worker due to the constant presence of danger, the need to apply authority, and a challenge for efficiency. The role of the police is to both protect and monitor the actions of the community, thus police are figures of authority and are authorized to use coercive force when necessary. This role of an authoritative figure, by nature, isolates the police from the rest of the community. This isolation is strengthened by the authorization to use coercive action, because any type of force will immediately divide those who are empowered with it and those whom it is used upon. The police are further isolated from the community because danger creates a form of solidarity within the police community, to which only other members of the force can relate. This strengthens the “us vs. them” component from within the police community.

The challenge for efficiency becomes problematic, as it diminishes the quality of the police’s job in the eyes of the community. This is what is meant by the “impossible mandate” (Manning, 1992). Striving for efficiency, the police have assumed the role of the professional “crime-fighter,” the “peace-keeper,” and the role of “keeper of order.” In doing so, they have taken on expectations of an “impossible mandate,” as Manning argues. Within the policing community, a subculture has evolved to attempt to fulfill that impossible mandate. There are certain rules that govern this subculture, rules that place greater emphasis on this exclusionary mentality. These rules explain what a good police officer is, the different rankings and who is favorably looked upon. Similarly, the public’s assessment of a “good” officer is one who solves crimes, and catches the serious offenders. The other two roles assumed by the police, peace-keeping and order-maintenance, are simply expected, but not used as performance measures. Even though the quality of a good police officer is one who solves crimes and catches criminals, the public’s view of a police officer is sometimes one who is above the law. There are many stigmas in popular culture associated with the police and their authorization of use of force, which only strengthen the police subculture and the “us vs. them” mindset.

**Neighborhood Characteristics**

A primary focus of this thesis is on neighborhood structural disadvantage is to understand the local conditions in which individuals live, how they cope with such conditions and how those structural characteristics can affect both municipal services as well as residents within the community. These social conditions and processes effect the growth of individuals within the community, and lay a foundation for negative ecological influences and physical dangers found in these environments (Delbert, 1996). All neighborhoods can be seen through an ecological-developmental perspective, (Bronfenbrenner, 1989), which assumes that neighborhoods are transactional settings that influence individual behavior and developments both directly and indirectly. Shaw and McKay (1942) laid this classical foundation for social ecology of neighborhoods, explaining that there is a direct relationship between conditions existing in local communities and differential rates of delinquents and criminals. This has been taken one step further by Delbert (1989), who explains that differences in neighborhood organization and culture are linked to individual-level outcomes. What this means is that the effectiveness of all municipal services – and police specifically-can vary by community-level characteristics as well as individual-level characteristics. The effectiveness of services can be seen as a derivative of the neighborhood variables that are determined by those social institutions and individuals who reside within those very communities. This concept may fall under the notion of “ecological contamination,” as previously theorized (Werthman and Piliavin, 1967). The police divide up the territories they patrol into readily understandable and racially shaped categories. The result is a process of what they called ecological contamination, whereby all persons encountered in "bad" neighborhoods are viewed as possessing the moral liability of the neighborhood itself. This process has various implications that may affect the way the police carry out routine calls for service in certain neighborhoods. This may also have implications for the way in which the individuals in these neighborhoods assume characteristic roles and personas.

**Disadvantaged neighborhoods**

Neighborhood disadvantage has been commonly measured as the concentration of poverty (See Blau & Blau, 1982; Hipp, 2007; Kane, 2005; Quane & Rankin, 1998; Sampson & Raudenbush, 2004; Sampson et al., 2002). This has also been extended to include rates of unemployment (See Hipp, 2007), residential instability (See Hipp, 2010; Quane & Rankin, 1998), cultural heterogeneity (See Blau & Blau, 1982; Hipp, 2007; Hipp, 2010; Kane, 2005; Rankin & Quane, 2002; Sampson & Raudenbush, 1999; Sampson & Raudenbush, 2004), economic inequalities (See Blau & Blau, 1982; Morenoff et al., 2001), family composition (See Cohen & Felson, 1979; Felson & Cohen, 1980; Hipp, 2007; Rankin & Quane, 2002; Sampson et al., 1998; Sampson et al., 1999), the impact of urban renewal (See Delbert, 1996; Shaw and McKay, 1942; Wilson, 1987; Sampson & Raudenbush, 1999), and collective efficacy (See Sampson & Raudenbush, 1999). Family income, cultural heterogeneity, neighborhood household tenure, poverty rate and population density have all been included as ecological indicators of neighborhood disadvantage. The use of a multidimensional approach to neighborhood disadvantage is necessary to determine differences among neighborhoods whose status may vary in social disorganization. Not all ghetto-poverty neighborhoods are characterized by high mobility, broken families, chronic unemployment or cultural heterogeneity; and these conditions of disadvantage may interact with poverty to produce certain variable outcomes (Delbert, 1996)

**Neighborhood Organization and Culture**

Disadvantaged neighborhoods, or neighborhoods that display projections of structural disadvantage, tend to disrupt the social organization process and cohesion within the neighborhood (Shaw and McKay, 1942; Park and Burgess, 1924). These types of neighborhoods often have lower rent values and attract lower-socioeconomic groups and diverse racial and ethnic backgrounds (Delbert, 1996; Blau & Blau, 1982; Morenoff et al., 2001). While these neighborhoods tend to have a closer proximity to jobs, more affordable housing and public transportation, they can be indicative of higher rates of poverty and residential instability (See Hipp, 2010; Quane & Rankin, 1998; Blau & Blau, 1982; Hipp, 2007; Kane, 2005; Quane & Rankin, 1998; Sampson & Raudenbush, 2004; Sampson et al., 2002). The racial/ethnic heterogeneity generates diversity in cultural values and norms, which sometimes creates a social divide among resident groups. Among other things, this divide is created by variation in languages and values, which results in a loss of communication among local residents. When communication is dysfunctional, a consensus cannot be met to uphold standards and norms within the community. This can result in a separation or disconnect in cultures and values, all within a single neighborhood. In doing so, the disadvantaged neighborhood may reach a tipping point that results in social disorganization. Differential disorganization results in high population turnover (See Hipp, 2010; Quane & Rankin, 1998), which creates difficulty in establishing shared standards and norms within that community (Rankin & Quane, 2002). The net result is no effective institutional presence or support for conventional behavior and a diminished capacity for informal social control (Delbert, 1996). Because there is little or no institutional integration at the neighborhood level, there are few intermediate structures that link primary and secondary institutions to one another (e.g., family, schools, friends, and work). In short, persons living in these neighborhoods are isolated from mainstream institutions (Wilson, 1987). They are far less able to access conventional means to achieve conventional societal goals, to support family socialization of mainstream values and norms, and to exert effective informal social control over the behavior of residents (Delbert, 1996).

The same causal processes that lead disadvantaged neighborhoods to weakened social controls and norms, also result in moral diversity (Shaw and McKay, 1942). Moral diversity, or normlessness, gives rise to delinquent and illegitimate enterprises. Delinquent value systems may be transmitted generationally. For example, one study found that offenders do not consistently assume the role of instigator or joiner over time, but instead switch from one role to the other depending on their relative position in the group in which they are participating at the time (Warr, 1996). It also found that offenders typically commit offenses with only a small number of co-offenders, but have substantially larger networks of accomplices (Warr, 1996). Illegitimate organizations feed off the lack of neighborhood social organization and structure, which results in neighborhoods that are disassociated with social services whether it be from lack of trust, negative experiences, or word of mouth. This disassociation from social services – including municipal police –, can translate into a lack of police effectiveness throughout the neighborhood.

A difference in police response times may be the outcome of the existence of structure barriers that differ from one neighborhood to another. While the ecology of neighborhoods explains the strains certain communities experience, the variations in police effectiveness may very well be a direct result of the ecological status within (Hunter, 1985; Bursik & Grasmick, 1993). If this is true, a change in policy might be needed to compliment the variations in neighborhoods to establish more effective municipal services throughout.

**Collective Efficacy**

Defined as social cohesion among neighbors and their willingness to intervene on behalf of the common good, social efficacy is linked to violence (Sampson et al, 1997). Informal social control also impacts broader issues of import to the well-being of neighborhoods - especially the differential ability of communities to extract resources and respond to cuts in public services (municipal services). A neighborhood that lacks social cohesion is commonly disadvantaged at both the individual and communal levels, while it is the community level effect that is more relevant to understanding differential police response times. As previously noted, disadvantaged neighborhoods are fertile communities for illegitimate enterprise which promotes a lack of unity among neighborhood members. The perception of violence and widespread public disorder generate neighborhood conditions that are marked by a lack communal trust and fear between individuals. This may result in neighborhoods that lack capacity to achieve common goals. Thus, it is reasonable to expect collective efficacy to affect how readily citizens call the police, and their willingness to communicate with the police openly.
Streets, parks, and sidewalks belong to no one - they therefore belong to everyone (Sampson & Raudenbush, 1999). Drawing from “broken windows” thesis, collective efficacy and disorder are paramount to understanding disadvantaged neighborhoods as a whole (Wilson & Kelling, 1982). The physical despair of buildings and urban blight play a vital role in the attitudes of the community. Neighborhoods that are disadvantaged may have less investment for maintaining properties and physical order. Investors are often more interested in other, more influential neighborhoods, potentially resulting in a further deterioration of the community. This, in turn, attracts poor and working class families with fewer resources and weakens bonds to social institutions.

**Neighborhood Disorder**

Disorder can be classified into two categories, physical disorder and social disorder. Physical disorder can be compromised of, but is not limited to, presence of graffiti, broken bottles and/or litter scattered throughout a neighborhood, deteriorated buildings, abandoned vehicles and unkempt properties (See Wilson & Kelling, 1982; Skogan, 1980; Skogan, 1986; Hipp, 2010; Sampson & Raudenbush, 1997; Sampson & Raudenbush, 1999). Physical disorder can be anything that is physically in existence that can be altered to a different state. Social disorder will then consist of different types of disorder that contain no physical presence but affect the neighborhood and its residents in a negative way. Social disorder can consist of, but is not limited to, constant presence of loitering, barking dog complaints, fireworks disturbance, loud noise disturbance, gang presence, drug activity presence, consumption of alcohol in public, and presence of transients (Wilson & Kelling, 1982; Sampson & Raudenbush, 1997). Physical disorder concerns property and the structural integrity of the physical image of a neighborhood, while social disorder concerns individuals and their behaviors that can directly or indirectly affect others within the neighborhood.

Disorder is heavily concentrated in disadvantaged communities; it tends to be high in the same generally poor places, whether it is assessed by outside observers or by the people who live in the community (Skogan, 1990; Skogan 2012; Hipp, 2010). Disorder is closely associated with many forms of common crime; because disorder undermines the social processes that help constrain neighborhood crime; or because disorder actually attracts and generates other forms of crime (Skogan, 1990; Skogan 2012). Disorder plays a role in undermining the stability of urban neighborhoods, undercutting natural processes of informal social control, discouraging investment, and stimulating fear of crime (Skogan, 2012).

 “Unwelcome police-citizen interactions are more likely to take place in distressed neighborhoods where aggressive policing efforts are disproportionately employed…most of their encounters with police were the result of officer-initiated contacts, and characterized officers’ demeanor as combative” (Brunson, 2010).

 Disorder and ecological contamination are then meshed together as police view the individuals in high disorder neighborhoods as reflections of the structure of the neighborhood. This causes the police to perceive the high amount of disorder as a result of each individual’s actions as an aggregate of the whole neighborhood. The police may then be aggressive toward individuals to complement their perception of the neighborhood. This may then be a causal link to the mistrust the community has with the police and instill fear where trust has diminished.

**Crime Victimization**

Existing victimization research indicates that structurally disadvantaged neighborhoods predict crime victimization, independent of individual-level predictors of victimization (Sampson et al., 1981; Sampson 1983; Sampson 1985). Diverse urban lifestyles often lead to differential exposure to dangerous places, times, and situations in which there are high risks of victimization (Felson & Cohen, 1980; Cohen & Felson, 1979; Meier and Miethe, 1993). Demographic attributes such as age, race, gender, income, marital status, education, and occupancy also play important roles in the probability of being victimized. Two major predictors of victimization are gender and income. Past research has found that women and children are more closely supervised and spend more time within the household (Hindelang, Gottfredson and Garofalo, 1978). This has traditionally led to more women assuming domestic jobs and responsibilities and enables men to assume jobs outside the household. With more men in the workplace and actively participating in public environments, the lifestyle-exposure theory explains higher victimization rates among men (Hindelang, Gottfredson and Garofalo, 1978). This can also be said for individuals residing within disadvantaged neighborhoods where men tend to take a more patriarchal outlook and may seek status through physical achievements. Income is also a major factor in victimization rates due to variability in lifestyle choices. A family/individual with a higher income may have more opportunities available in housing location, transportation, job opportunities, leisure activities and associations with others (Meier and Miethe, 1993). This results in disadvantaged neighborhoods being a setting for residents who feel stagnant and increasingly desperate.

**Peers Within Disadvantaged Neighborhoods**

Prior research testing the differential association theory as an explanation of delinquent behavior has placed importance on an individual’s bond with peers’ household environment. Belief systems and illegal behavior, as suggested by Hirschi (Hirschi, 1969), do appear to have influence on techniques of neutralization (Minor, 1984) and perhaps on conventional values (Matsueda, 1989), but the effects of belief systems as operationalized by Hirschi on illegal behavior appear to be weak or nonexistent (Menard and Huizinga, 1994). Menard and Huizinga found that “weakening of conventional beliefs usually takes place before initiation of illegal behavior, but once both have occurred, illegal behavior has a stronger influence on conventional beliefs than conventional beliefs have on illegal behavior, and the influence of conventional beliefs on illegal behavior is indirect, mediated by exposure to delinquent peers” (Menard and Huizinga, 1994). This research found that delinquent behavior has a stronger influence on delinquency than does conventional beliefs favorable to violation of law.

Prior to this research, Menard and Huizinga found that the effects of broken homes and attachment to parents and peers are mediated by the learning of definitions of delinquency (Matsueda and Heimer, 1987). Similarly, Robert Agnew found that delinquent individuals who had delinquent peers had a stronger involvement in delinquency (Agnew, 1991). One of the most consistent findings in delinquency research, adolescents with delinquent peers are more likely to be delinquent themselves (Agnew, 1994). Associating with delinquent peers leads to greater involvement in delinquency via the reinforcing environment of the peer network. Engaging in delinquency, in turn, leads to increases in associations with delinquent peers. Finally, delinquent beliefs exert lagged effects on peers and behavior, which in turn “solidify” the formation of delinquent beliefs (Thornberry Et Al., 1994). Thornberry supported these research findings with the assertion

“Delinquent peers are likely to reinforce delinquency, and as the subject anticipates and experiences those positive peer reactions, delinquency is likely to increase. In turn, the more a person engages in delinquency, the more likely he or she is to associate with delinquent peers” (Thornberry Et Al., 1994).

Delinquent behavior may result in gravitation toward groups that positively reinforce delinquent behavior, which in turn garners attitudes congruent toward delinquency. In Jensen’s study, he found that the nature of the parent-child relationship is also an important determinant of involvement in delinquency (See, Healy and Bronner, 1936; Glueck and Glueck, 1950; Nye, 1958; Gold, 1963; Hirschi 1969).

**“Underworld” Parameters**

Third parties, when in groups or as individuals, can act as escalators of conflict due to a modern social expectation of “honor.” This sense of honor is constructed throughout society and holds no material value, but can be worth almost everything in underclass areas (Anderson, 2000). Any type of interaction between two individuals is precluded to be between the two said parties. Third parties are those affiliated with either previously said parties or individuals who are in immediate proximity of the interaction of the two individuals. The partisanship that third parties hold for certain groups and individuals is tied to their own honor status as well as the honor status of those groups and other individuals. As a neighborhood, the code of the streets may play an important role in the way in which individuals behave. The presence of third parties may mean that police assistance would result in a loss of honor, and a sign of weakness in the individual. In an event that an incident does occur, the code of the streets may hinder the efficiency of the police through neighborhood resolution. What this means is that if a breach of honor is made by an individual, that honor may be avenged by the recipient of the disrespected. In that type of altercation, third parties that are close to the individual whose honor was breached will act as a conflict escalator and aid in avenging his honor. If an altercation occurs where an individual is the one who breaches the honor of another, third parties close to that aggressor may try to quell the conflict as it is now over from their perspective. “Breaches of honor – sometimes known as disrespect or “dissing” – are at the root of much violence in modern societies” (Cooney, pg 112). Something as simple as a malicious comment can escalate into a violent altercation, due to the modern need for respect in poor urban areas and variation of third parties available to the initial altercation. “Many disputes about honor continue to be triggered by comparatively minor incidents” (Cooney, pg117). Regardless of an individual’s position on the vertical space scale, to maintain a certain reputation, the individual must always be aware of their surroundings and must always be willing to fight for their place in their social circle (Anderson, 2000).

Cooney argues that, those who reside within the ghetto live under a stateless society, whose principles are different than that of the rest of the country. Within the ghetto, the potential third parties are not a means for resolution. Potential third parties are made up of municipal actors such as the police, educators and social service providers. In a stateless society, individuals act on their own and do not seek resolution from potential third parties, they seek it elsewhere. The lack of potential third parties may be due to mistrust in the state as a whole. Structural disadvantage in these neighborhoods has resulted in a separation from these potential third parties and continues to socially alienate the neighborhood. As a proxy in the absence of the state, the honor code is created through “virtual statelessness.” So, in ghettos of America, the honor code prevails and dictates how conflicts are resolved. This results in a reluctance to activate formal social control mechanisms and a reliance on informal mechanisms that often involve physical conflict throughout the entire society, as the honor code reflects an individuals’ status appearance upon the community, over the community’s status as a whole (Anderson, 2000). Without effective informal social controls, threats of or actual violence are the only settlement agents, where the involvement of formal control will only occur as a product of that violence.

Acts of violence are perceived as a violation against the normative and against the entirety as a whole. This can be true for societies controlled and managed by potential third parties, agencies that are “unbiased” by nature and whose purpose is to maintain balance within the community. The underworld does not exist in the same way, however. It is so far down on the vertical space scale that it exists without potential third party influence. The vertical space scale is explained by Jacobs and Wright as a social scale that categorizes individuals and groups of individuals as importance, relative to the controls of that society (Jacobs & Wright, 2006). The lack of potential third party influence may result in a separation between the neighborhoods and the municipal services. This can be for a variety of reasons, but will ultimately result in a decrease in efficiency for municipal services in these neighborhoods.

Where potential third parties uphold the law as boundaries that ought not to be crossed, state societies give rise to potential third parties as professional agencies whose morals, ideals and behaviors are righteous in action. This perspective views that the collective is a congruent mass that can lend aid to citizens in times of need and where individuals act on behalf of each other. It is the role of third parties to maintain that fluid balance, seek out and remedy incident that opposes that way of thought. Within the underworld, there is no fluid balance of a congruent mass. There is a balance present, but it is primarily contingent on individualism and self-preservation.

“The street criminal underworld is perhaps prototypical in this regard: It exists largely beyond the reach of formal law and continues to lionize honor – as something to be protected at all costs” (Jacobs & Wright, 2006).

Offenders partake in illegal activities often, which add to the separation from potential third parties. In context of the underworld, there is little to no desire for potential third parties to become involved with disputes. This attitude persists throughout the underworld, creating the environment that becomes self-reliant. Police are limited, confined, and held as a distance for a few reasons, but primarily due to the offender’s involvement in illegal enterprises and but also due to the honor code established in the eclipse of the state and its potential third parties. They are also held at a distance due to the street criminal’s perception of the policeman as equal level, or sometimes lower, on the honesty scale (Jacobs & Wright, 2006; Black, 1998; Cooney, 1998).

“Criminals are often reticent to report being victimized to the police for fear of exposing their own illicit activities…they are unlikely to be taken seriously because of a widespread belief among officers that lawbreakers deserve whatever fate befall them…street criminals cannot really be victims in the eyes of the law; they are on their own when it comes to seeing justice done” (Jacobs & Wright, 2006).

It is this dynamic that produces such a divide between the underworld and society outside of it. Individuals in these underworld ghettos are existing in structurally disadvantaged neighborhoods that lack sufficient resources to maintain a quality of life seen in surrounding areas. Due to the honor code and the perceived social system inside these structurally disadvantaged neighborhoods, individuals might not call the police for any reason. If they do, they might delay in calling until out of view of third parties or until they deem necessary. Once police arrive, they might make it difficult for police to effectively carry out support, as the code regards potential third parties as a nuisance.

Police might not be efficient in responding to calls for service in these structurally disadvantaged neighborhoods due to deliberate delays in response time, as they may see these neighborhoods and the individuals who reside within them as deserving of the activities that occur. The police might be delayed in response time due to external factors out of their reach, numerous calls for service results in a larger queue which would result in longer response times. These neighborhoods tend to be more dense, which would assume shorter travel distances for officers, suggesting shorter response times. While travel distance may be shorter, neighborhoods that are more dense might see a higher total aggregate calls for service, which will result in much longer queue times. Structurally disadvantaged neighborhoods tend to have individuals reluctant to contact police, and if contact is made, may still be reluctant to give any information to help the police efficiently carry out their support. Reluctant individuals within neighborhoods with longer queue times may result in much longer response times for police.

Supporting the notion that the underworld is a society of self-preservation, criminal retaliation is now understood as a mechanism evolved from the lack of connection to state utilities within a stateless society. Therefore, it is reasonable to expect this normative value system in disadvantaged neighborhoods to directly impact the call for service – police response dynamic. The quality and efficiency of city service may suffer as a result of these contextual processes. It has evolved into this form because there was once a time when criminal retaliation was not the key mechanism for self-survival, a time when the vertical gap was not so substantial.

Police policy is designed to respond efficiently to public demand, and inefficiencies could disrupt the status quo. The status quo does not center on the urban underworld, rather it is defined by society outside this subculture. However, inattention to these subculture value systems of those lower on the vertical space scale has actually created the environment of where the underworld persists. The police are the potential third parties who represent the state society, thus they are control agents of the status quo. In the underworld,

“Police are seen as indolent, loathe to expend the time and effort required to follow through on leads, and apathetic about pursuing real justice.” “The law may be tough in theory but, according to the offenders, its practical application is substantially less intimidating” (Jacobs & Wright, 2006).

Criminal retaliation has many purposes, all of which are focused on the individual. In a stateless society there are very few, if any, mediatory agencies that parties on either side can readily seek out. This leads to individuals seeking mediation through other individuals, within their personal social network.

“The cultural ethos of the street corner, in which self-reliance is paramount and maintain a reputation for toughness dominates day-to-day interaction” (Jacobs & Wright, 2006).

The attitude of the urban underclass influences how individuals perceive one another, seeing others as a personal threat. This lifestyle creates the necessity for both action and reaction to any potential situation.

“Responses, good or bad, give rise to an informal but powerful status hierarchy that mediates how people perceive, judge, and treat you. A decisive counter-strike projects an image of someone not to be crossed, helping to insulate you from future predation…The retaliatory ethics therefore reflects not just a desire to punish, but also a perceived need to deter future aggression” (Jacobs & Wright, 2006).

What the rest of society perceives as countless, random acts of violence in an underworld that has no law, may actually be seen as a series of calculated acts of retaliation and preemptive strikes to establish and defend one’s existence. As the function and view of police change, so does the infrastructure of the cities in which they police. Cities have become deteriorated and the cost of governance has escalated (Manning, 1992). An increase in police foot patrol presence and order maintenance had a minimal, but the very least, an effect on various types of crimes. With this knowledge, a reform in the way certain areas of a city are policed should be in order. People rely on the police to fix many social problems, rather than police them. “The police now are viewed by some observers as business rather than as public service” (Manning, 1992).

The public service role of the police is to protect and serve the citizens of their community. Effectiveness and efficiency of the police are transparent through the cooperation of officers and the community. While we know how incident characteristics – priority of a call for service – affect response time, we still know little about how neighborhood structure affects it. The focus of this thesis is to understand police effectiveness using the priority of a call for service and taking it further to use the neighborhood structure of those calls for service. Police effectiveness is operationalized by response time to calls for service. We may then be able to draw upon the data to develop any relationship between neighborhood structure and police response time. In doing so, we might be able to further understand how neighborhood structure affects police response time.

**Research Questions**

While previous research has examined incident-level predictors of response time, neighborhood characteristics, the cultural perspective, and victimization separately, limited research has incorporated all of these elements to develop a greater understanding of how neighborhood conditions affect police efficiency. In this study, I hope to answer several research questions to understand police efficiency within the realm of both the department and the communities in which they serve. Studying police efficiency by examining only crime-incident level predictors of response time allows only one perspective – that of the police agencies. Incorporating information about neighborhoods and their structural characteristics allows for a broader perspective for understanding how neighborhood disadvantage impacts police response time. My research questions are as follows:

1. How does the call priority, as measured by the priority response index (PRI), effect police response time to calls for service?
2. Once the call priority code has been disaggregated, how do characteristics of the crime incident (e.g. violent/nonviolent, disorder/nondisorder, time occurred, etc.) effect police response time to calls for service?
3. Holding crime incident characteristics constant, how does neighborhood-level structural disadvantage effect police response time to calls for service?

**RESEARCH DESIGN**

**Data Collection**

I gathered, coded, and analyzed data for this thesis from Chandler Police Department’s (CPD) internal database records. Data collection and development of my research questions occurred in Fall 2011/Spring 2012 when I served as an intern for the CPD’s Crime Analysis Division and took part in entering large numbers of crime incident reports to the official police database. The data were generated from calls for service received by communicators and then dispatched to patrol officers and their superiors. This information is logged into the incident report system by both members of dispatch and by patrol officers who are on site. After the information is sent into the city records for verification, the information is then relayed to members of the Crime Analysis Division where it is subsequently entered into a new system that is used for analysis and comparison of all calls for service. These records are streamlined for department purposes to obtain information on calls for service quality and improvement. The data set used for this thesis is from the crime analysis system, after city approval of officer and dispatch description, where all coding is done to department standards for their needs. The data includes all calls to the Chandler Police Department (N= 17,164) for the 2011 calendar year relating to felony crimes, misdemeanor offenses, and public disorder. Table 1 below includes the call categories, frequencies, and mean response times for each category.

The second data set draws from the social ecology of the city being evaluated. The data sets were obtained from the US Census Bureau website that is publically available for download and analysis. This information consists of surveys conducted by the US Census Bureau to be completed by each household throughout the country. The information is then analyzed and provided in aggregate by the US Census Bureau and available in subsection data sets for various demographic categories. The use of this information allows for implementation and speculation on neighborhood level variables to tap into the social ecology of the area. I specifically collected census tract-level measures of structural disadvantage and racial composition for the entire city of Chandler, AZ. This data were then merged with incident-level call data that were geocoded to specific locations.

**Dependent Variable**

This study focuses on the calls for service within the Chandler Police Department and aims to better understand police efficiency in a neighborhood context. I am measuring police efficiency as response time to each incident. This response time is measured from “hello-to-hello,” meaning from the time dispatch answers the 911 call to the time an officer is physically present with the reporting party. I elected to focus on the response time of officers for all crime-related calls for service from January 1st 2011 – December 31st 2011 within the city of Chandler. This allows for an examination of response rates for different types of calls with different priority rankings. No sampling strategy was necessary, as I included all major crime-related call types in my analysis.

The 12 months of data are made up of 140,366 different calls for service within the metropolitan city. Roughly 12.2% (n =17,164) of these calls for service are used in the analysis of response time. I omitted approximately 87.9% of the calls for service, as they are not crime related. These omitted call types include false alarms, traffic-related incidents, 911 hang-ups, and other non-incident service calls. Further omission of calls for service occurred for times over 3 hours, as the initial responding officer has already been on scene but requested special assistance (K9, SAU, Air assistance, CSI) which takes a longer amount of time and is logged as the ending response time for that incident. The types of offenses are further recoded to denote violent and non-violent offenses, the timing of the incident (in progress, just occurred, or report), whether or not it was a disorder incident, and the volume of call activity on that day.

Within the crime-related offenses, the calls for service are categorized into a streamlined priority response index (PRI), to indicate seriousness of offense and response time approximation. The priority response index is as follows for this department:

Table 1

DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF RESPONSE TIME

AND NEIGHBORHOOD CHARACTERISTICS

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|   | N | Minimum | Maximum | Mean | Std. Deviation |
| Felony crime (yes/no) | 17164 | 0 | 1 | .27 | .445 |
| Misdemeanor crime (yes/no) | 17164 | 0 | 1 | .54 | .498 |
| Disorder incident (yes/no) | 17164 | 0 | 1 | .18 | .386 |
| Violent crime (yes/no) | 17164 | 0 | 1 | .37 | .484 |
| Is this the incident in progress, just occurred, or a report of a past event? | 17164 | 0 | 2 | .66 | .560 |
| Did this call come from an apartment building? | 17164 | 0 | 1 | .22 | .413 |
| At about what time of day did the call occur? | 17164 | 0 | 2 | 1.10 | .756 |
| Did the call occur on a weekend day? | 17164 | 0 | 1 | .47 | .499 |
| What season did the call occur in? | 17164 | 1 | 4 | 2.49 | 1.112 |
| Did the call occur in a crime hot spot? | 17164 | 0 | 1 | .33 | .471 |
| Volume of call activity | 17164 | 1 | 13 | 3.40 | 1.826 |
| Minority concentration | 16640 | -2.237 | 2.207 |  |  |
| Structural disadvantage | 16640 | -3.541 | 1.983 |  |  |
| Response time | 17164 | .03 | 179.40 | 24.368 | 30.667 |
| Valid N (listwise) | 16640 |   |   |   |   |

**Independent Variables**

**Categorical**

The first set of analyses focuses on the call priority code relating to the type of incident that has generated a request for service. There are eight tiers within the “PRI” (response priority index) that group the various 153 types of incidents further, into a streamlined priority index (PRI). A PRI of “3” requires immediate police service while a PRI of “0” requires police service within an hour, depending on factors of incoming calls for service and location of officer. For the most part, a PRI of “2” requires police service within 10 minutes, while a PRI of “1” requires police service within 15 minutes. These numbers are all based off on time when dispatch relays the incident to the officers after being determined by the dispatchers through a conversation with the caller. As more calls for service are requested, the PRI is streamlined to place new “3’s” before any “2’s” or “1’s,” even if they are past the 10 or 15 minute marks. This is done to ensure all calls for service that require immediate police service are tended to in the shortest possible time frame.

**Priority Assignment of Calls Definition**

1. Priority One Calls: (Emergency) Any threats to life or danger of serious physical injury or major property damage; any felony or violent misdemeanor where the suspect has remained at the scene or may be apprehended in the immediate area; when an officer does not respond to radio calls and his/her welfare is question.
2. Dispatch immediately. Send primary unit and as necessary, a backup. When possible, the dispatcher will consult the AVL monitor to determine the closest unit when dispatching Priority 1 calls and Emergency Traffic (e.g. 905, 906, 998, and 999). If it is not possible to consult the AVL monitor, the sequence of unit assignment for primary units will prevail. The AVL monitor is on a multi-use computer but should be the primary displayed program. Exception**:** Situations where another program is being accessed to conduct police related business.
3. Priority Two Calls**:** (Urgent) Any incident currently in progress that does not represent a significant threat to life or property.
4. Dispatch according to sequence of unit assignment, if first unit in sequence is not available, the call may hold no longer than 10 minutes, unless a patrol supervisor approves it holding longer. For non-emergency calls, take into consideration the sequence of unit assignment using the “city split” guidelineswhen assigning adjacent/closest beats and units. When using this sequence, officers may be dispatched if they are in a clearable status (10-10, C7, paper, etc.).
5. Priority Three Calls: (Routine) Any incident or request not in progress, involving minor offenses, or when the complainant has delayed reporting for more than 30 minutes.
6. Dispatch according to sequence of unit assignment as soon as possible. If the first unit in the sequence is not available after 60 minutes, call the complainant back and advise of the delay, then follow the sequence or unit assignment. For non-emergency calls, take into consideration the sequence of unit assignment using the “city split” guidelineswhen assigning adjacent/closest beats and units. When using this sequence, officers may be dispatched if they are in a clearable status (10-10, C7, paper, etc.).
7. Priority Four Calls: Any calls for service that are handled by the guidelines established in the General Order on “Desk Officer/CIV.”
8. Dispatch the desk officer via MDC as soon as possible. After 60 minutes call the complainant back and advise of the delay, then dispatch according to the sequence of unit assignment. For non-emergency calls, take into consideration the sequence of unit assignment using the “city split” guidelineswhen assigning adjacent/closest beats and units. When using this sequence, officers may be dispatched if they are in a clearable status (10-10, C7, paper, etc.).
9. No maximum number of calls will be held in the queue per desk position.

There are eleven categorical variables used in this study to understand how crime incident characteristics may have an effect on officer response time. The second of the eleven variables is the felony crime characteristic. This is a dichotomous variable that indicates whether a call for service is for a felony crime. A call for service that is considered a felony crime will result in a “1,” while a call for service that is not considered a felony crime will result in a “0.”

The third categorical variable is the disorder incident. This is a dichotomous variable that indicates whether the call for service is for a disorder incident. A call for service that is considered a disorder incident will result in a “1,” while a call for service that is not considered a disorder incident will result in a “0.”

The fourth categorical variable is the misdemeanor crime. This is a dichotomous variable that indicates whether the call for service is for a misdemeanor crime. A call for service that is considered a misdemeanor crime will result in a “1,” while a call for service that is not considered a misdemeanor crime will result in a “0.”

The fifth categorical variable used is the timing of the incident. This variable has three categories that indicate whether the call for service requested is for an incident that is: “in progress,” “just occurred,” or a “report of a past event.” Calls for service within a police department consist of a variety of incident types. Chandler Police Department has 153 types of police incidents in the system that varies from a simple 911 hang up to homicide, etc. This variable identifies the timeline of the incident.

The sixth categorical variable is the call from an apartment. This is a dichotomous variable that indicates whether the call for service is requested at an apartment building. A call for service that is requested at an apartment building will result in a “1,” while a call for service that is not requested at an apartment building will result in a “0.”

The seventh categorical variable call hour variable that categorizes the incident as to when the call occurred. This variable consists of three categories: Morning, Afternoon/Evening, and Night. This is based on when it is received by the dispatcher, before the call is relayed to the patrol officers. It is useful to see if there were any discrepancies, not only by the officers, but also by the dispatchers in terms of response time and time of day. Since the response time is affected by individuals who call in, dispatchers, and officers, it is appropriate to control for the call hour. This is because there are generally more calls for service during the day than there are at night, as more people tend to sleep during the night and are not observant of or involved in, incidents until the day time.

The eighth categorical variable used in this study is the day of the week variable. This is a dichotomous variable that indicate whether the call for service was requested on a weekday or a weekend. This is used for streamlining purposes to observe patterns in response time that may be affected by individuals who call in, what type of incident it is, and by the officers and dispatchers. For example, certain types of incidents are called in more frequently on certain days of the week. Thefts and burglaries tend to be called in on a Monday or Tuesday as they are not discovered until after the weekend (such as cases of home burglaries where individuals are out of town at the time of the crime).

The ninth categorical variable in this study is the month variable. This variable consists of four categories that groups the months into seasons: Summer, Fall, Winter, Spring. Like that of the weekday variable, the month is controlled for to determine patterns in both incidents and response time by officers over time. The response time of officers are approximately the same throughout each month. As seasons affect almost everything in a social context, it is important to observe and control for the season in which the call for service was requested, as it will most likely have an effect of the response time of the officer.

The tenth categorical variable is dichotomous and indicates whether the call for service was requested within a “hot spot” area or not. The department divides the city into sections that are more easily serviced and identifiable by the department, into varying beats. These “beats” are groupings of neighborhoods that contain similar characteristics with their close surroundings, thus allowing the department to familiarize themselves with the social ecology and physical location. The city consists of 17 beats that descend from north west to south east, roughly (See Appendix H). Beats are made up of different populations and zoning sections.

The eleventh categorical variable is the volume of calls per day. This variable indicates the volume of calls occurring during the same time of day and day as the requested call for service. This is used to determine whether a large volume of calls will inundate officers with calls for service and affect response time.

**Neighborhood Characteristics**

 This study contains census tracts from the 2010 census administered and data-aggregated by the United States government. The calls for service have been married to the census tracts available for public use for the city of Chandler, Arizona. Specific data about the neighborhood characteristics of Chandler were then obtained and merged with the newly merged calls for service data. This data set was obtained to categorize areas based on levels of neighborhood disadvantage and racial composition. In this study, I operationalize neighborhoods as police beats. I have done so to increase the neighborhood-level degrees of freedom the district level positioned above the beats, providing more statistical power. The categories are as follows:

 The first neighborhood characteristic obtained is minority concentration. Race information was obtained from the US Census Bureau to measure the percentage of Whites, Hispanics and Asians within each census tract. The tracts were then merged into the various predetermined police beats to obtain the percentage of Whites, Hispanics and Asians living within each beat. These categories were then paired to the total population of each beat to find the percent White, percent Hispanic and percent Asian in each beat.

 The second neighborhood variable obtained is structural disadvantage. This consists of the percent of individuals living in poverty, the percent of individuals whom rent as their tenure, the percent of Black population, and the population density for each beat. This variable reflects the amount of individuals, whose residential tenure is by rent, separating from those who have a mortgage to own or currently own. Neighborhoods that contain an abundance of renting residential tenure tend to have more residential mobility and less cohesiveness. This variable reflects the proportion of individuals whom live under the poverty line. Neighborhoods that contain an abundance of individuals living under the poverty line tend to have lower housing markets and attract low-wage rent.

This also allows for the recognition of racial percentages within each beat. The population density will indicate whether more densely populated areas are inundated with calls for service that may affect response time.

 The neighborhood characteristics were obtained to determine varying levels of neighborhood advantages and disadvantages. As previously explained, disadvantaged neighborhoods tend to have more issues with cohesiveness and collective efficacy, possibly resulting in more calls for service

TABLE 2

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Model 1 |  |  | Model2 |  |  | Model 3 |  |  |
|  | Coefficient | SE | P>|z | Coefficient | SE | P>|z | Coefficient | SE | P>|z |
| PRI | -10.41 | .24 | 0.00 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Felony |  |  |  | -1.42 | 0.56 | 0.01 | -1.37 | 0.57 | 0.02 |
| Disorder |  |  |  | 7.22 | 0.75 | 0.00 | 7.16 | 0.76 | 0.00 |
| Misdemeanor |  |  |  |  | 0.84 | 0.00 |  | 0.86 | 0.00 |
| Violent |  |  |  | -6.55 | 0.61 | 0.00 | -6.67 | 0.62 | 0.00 |
| In Progress, Just Occurred, Report |  |  |  | -12.03 | 0.51 | 0.00 | -12.04 | 0.51 | 0.00 |
| Apartment |  |  |  | -0.99 | 0.54 | 0.07 | -1.08 | 0.55 | 0.05 |
| Time of Day |  |  |  | -0.94 | 0.33 | 0.01 | -0.87 | 0.33 | 0.01 |
| Weekend |  |  |  | -2.85 | 0.46 | 0.00 | -2.86 | 0.46 | 0.00 |
| Season |  |  |  | -0.20 | 0.20 | 0.31 | -0.15 | 0.20 | 0.45 |
| Hot Spot |  |  |  | 3.80 | 0.48 | 0.00 | 3.32 | 0.49 | 0.00 |
| Volume of Call Activity |  |  |  | 1.01 | 0.13 | 0.00 | 1.02 | 0.13 | 0.00 |
| Minority Concentration |  |  |  |  |  |  | 0.33 | 0.23 | 0.16 |
| Structural Disadvantage |  |  |  |  |  |  | 0.59 | 0.23 | 0.01 |

DEPARTMENT LEVEL AND TRACT LEVEL REGRESSION OF POLICE REPONSE TIMES

||Note --- N = 17164. All regression models are at the 95% confidence interval.

**RESULTS**

Three models were run through HLM regression to determine the effects, if any, that the created variables had on police response time. These variables were used to create two factors, minority concentration and structural disadvantage. These factors have to do with the area of the neighborhoods in question. Three variables were loaded in to minority concentration: percent Hispanic, percent Asian, and percent White. Four variables were loaded in structural disadvantage: percent Black, percent in poverty, percent renting, and population density. Eigen values for the two factors were greater than 1 and all factor loadings were above .7, while only 1 variable was not, percent in poverty.

The extraction method for these regressions was principle component analysis. The orthological rotation method used was verimax rotation with Kaiser Normalization (See Appendix A)

**Level 1 Variables**

While the initial models were run with all categories of level one data, data was recoded due to the large variability within the variables, causing over specification in the outcomes. In doing so, the Table 2 allows for more modified specification within the variables to develop a clearer understanding of the correlation and significance in the findings. Table 2 presents the results of the bivariate and multivariate proportional models designed to estimate the response time of officers in calls for service. Model 1 serves as a baseline model and includes the streamlined PRI controls. As the outcome displays, PRI has a negative coefficient, as expected. This illustrates the effectiveness of the PRI system as priority goes up, response time decreases.

FIGURE 1

|  |
| --- |
| DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS INCIDENT OCCURENCE |
|  | N | Minimum | Maximum | Mean | Std. Deviation |
| Report of a past event | 6663 | .03 | 179.10 | 32.9893 | 36.19568 |
|  |   |   |   |   |
| Just occurred | 9745 | .03 | 179.40 | 19.9095 | 25.57479 |
|  |   |   |   |   |
| In progress | 756 | .07 | 159.57 | 5.8625 | 11.08246 |
|  |   |   |   |   |

Figure 1 displays the descriptive statistics for whether a call for service was in progress, just occurred, or a report of a past event. This is most closely related to the PRI, as the department’s response index is determined by time of incident among other variables.

Police are inundated with priority 1 calls which are lower on the PRI, resulting in longer response times due to both an influx of calls for service in queue as well as it constantly being raised in the queue due to low priority. Priority “0” calls for service are, on average, responded to more quickly than priority “1” because patrol officers are not tending to these calls. These are calls for service logged into the system from a desk officer who is stationed inside the precinct. They are still classified as a call for service to streamline and categorize all incident reports, but are responded to by different officers.

Model 2 has added level 2 variables to incorporate more department-level categories. As previously explained, the model has been compressed to specific categories within each variable, to account for over specification. This regression found that weekends tended to have faster response times. This could be a result of more calls for service being requested during the weekday, more officers on duty during the weekend, or different types of calls for service might be requested more often during the weekday/weekend. This usually occurs for a few reasons, if individuals were out of town and their home/vehicle were burglarized and they did not notice until the following weekday. People are more comfortable with reporting an incident on a weekday, as the weekend are more often leisure days that should not be interrupted by talking with police and filling out an entire incident report. This is not surprising as the calls for service are a continuous variable that are a human construction in social realms. This is to mean that crimes are committed and discovered daily, regardless of the day of the month or day of the week. These variables do show a hint of patterns in which types of crimes are called for service around similar days of the week or weekend.

Whether a call for service was requested in a hot spot showed significant levels on the impact of police response time. The models show that a call for service within a hot spot area would increase the response time by a coefficient of 3.32. This can be due to a large amount of calls for service each day, resulting in longer queue times for newly appointed calls for service, than that of other areas. This can also be an effect of the previously discussed perceptions of both the police and residents. A model with level 2 variables will be able to determine the significance of neighborhood characteristics and a possibility of perception effects.

The time of day a call for service was requested showed a small but significant effect to police response time. Model 2 shows the outcome of significance. This is probably due to the fact that the majority of society is awake during the day and asleep during the night, resulting in the majority of calls for service being requested during the day. Crimes that have been committed during the night may go undiscovered until the following morning. There are more human interactions during the day, resulting in a higher probability that calls for service will be requested at a higher rate during those hours of greater interaction.

 Seasonal differences found no significant levels for police response times. The pacific southwest has generally less extreme weather throughout the year, than that of the Midwest and East, which may result in less of a social change among seasons. This might be the reason why there was no significance found in police response time for seasonal differences.

 Whether the call for service was for a violent offense showed a large significant value. Generally, calls for service that were for violent offenses showed a decrease in response time by a coefficient of 6.67. This is expected as violent offenses tend to result in harm toward individuals or harmful situations that can lead to serious injury or death. These incidents are taken very seriously and are placed on the top of the PRI, resulting in faster response times.

FIGURE 2

|  |
| --- |
| DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS VIOLENT VS NONVIOLENT |
| Violent crime  | N | Minimum | Maximum | Mean | Std. Deviation |
| No | 10747 | .03 | 179.10 | 29.8602 | 33.31481 |
|  |   |   |   |   |
| Yes | 6417 | .03 | 179.40 | 15.1707 | 22.84398 |
|  |   |   |   |   |

Figure 2 illustrates the average response times for a violent versus a nonviolent call for service. As for the rape offense, the vast majority of these calls for service are long after the initial offense took place. Far too often, the individual who has been a victim of crime does not want to disclose this traumatizing information for fear of embarrassment only to report the incident after talking with friends and family. Usually this is conducted at a local hospital where a rape kit evaluation has been conducted, thus a longer response time average as the priority is lower on the PRI even though the offense is extremely heinous.

A call for service for a felony crime reduced the response time of officers by a coefficient of 1.37, indicating that felony crimes are considered higher priority. This could be due to felony crimes consisting of various violent offenses where it has already been determined that violent offenses have response times half of calls for service that are not violent. Whether the call for service was a disorder incident, showed a significant value resulting in a coefficient increase of 7.16. While disorder incidents generally do not involve any immediate harm toward individuals, they make up a large portion of community concern.

Whether a call for service was requested at an apartment building had a small but somewhat significant effect on response time. A decrease in response time was seen for calls requested at an apartment building saw a change in the coefficient of 1.08. This could be due to the density of the apartments, requiring officers to travel less distances. More calls for service may occur in these residential areas, as more individuals live there, which would allow the officers to become familiar with the area and result in shorter response time. Some apartments are gated communities, which would result in an increase in response time, however, the regressions show a decrease for requests to apartment buildings.

The variable with the greatest effect on response time was whether the incident is in progress, just occurred, or is a report of a past event. With a coefficient of -12.04, this shows that calls for service for incidents that just occurred has response times around 12 minutes faster than calls for service for incidents that are reports of past events. This also indicates that incidents in progress have response times 12 minutes faster than calls for service of incidents that just occurred (See figure 1).

The volume of call activity on each particular day and hour had small but significant effects on police response time. With a coefficient increase of 1.02, calls for service that occurred during times of high call volume activity would generally see an increase in response time, holing all other variables constant.

**Level 2 Variables**

Model 3 has the added level 2 variables of neighborhood characteristics in the regression, to account for any significance in response times. Minority concentration showed very little effects with little to no significance. Structural disadvantage, however, showed a small effect with a small significance factor. This is very important to note as previous studies have not considered structural disadvantage when evaluating police response time. This effect can be from a multitude of factors as previously explained by the literature and past studies conducted within neighborhood disadvantage. It is important to further examine these findings and better understand the relationship between structural disadvantage and police response times in terms of individual officer relationships, departmental relationships and neighborhood relationships. Note that the regression found 90% of the total variance in the model is not explained.

**Discussion**

**Practical Implications**

There are a few problems with the data that have given the results some biasing and poor strength. Functional form misspecification tests were performed on the data to make sure there were no specification problems. The outcome did, in fact, prove that the data is free of functional form misspecification and there are no missing variables. While there was originally over specification, as previously explained, the new models have condensed and selected variables to account for this. What was found to be wrong with the data is the amount of heteroskedasticity within the variables. This has already been concluded that it is not model misspecification so it must be from a bounded independent variable. Since the lower limit of response time is 0, the minimum residual and error variance is artificially limited for high priority calls for service. The RESET test was conducted to test for Functional Form Misspecification. The test failed to reject the null hypothesis, resulting in a lack of functional form misspecification. This may occur if AGE was used in the model to determine percent juvenile/adult, however this data was unavailable at the time so it was not implemented into the model.

Hypothesis testing was done on all the variables to ensure the error was equally distributed throughout. The results found a strong correlation between PRI and the various types of calls for service, as expected. These variables are covering similar analysis, but they are equally important in understanding patterns in response time as reactionary to the calls for service. The results of the rest of the variables shows that the error within the models run are equally distributed. This sample size is rather large, which helps to overcome the unequally distributed error in two of the variables.

Data is not available for the exact number of officers on patrol for each call for service incident, that information is not logged by any officer to analyst. Chandler Police Department does conduct research to obtain the amount of officers on duty per day, averaging the amount of officers on patrol each hour, throughout the year. Table 3 shows the department’s average amount of officers out on patrol duty for each allotted hour throughout a day, averaged for the entire year. While this information is important in understanding response times, because only the average number of officers for the entire year is available, it is assumed to be held constant for the previous models as the figures in Table 3 are the same throughout. The department has 17 beats, so they make every attempt to have a minimum of 17 patrol units out at any given time. Due to scheduling, personnel and the human variability, it is not always possible to have a minimum of 17 units.

Table 3

|  |
| --- |
| ACTUAL LOGGED IN PATROL UNITS - AVERAGE PER DAY OF WEEK/HOUR OF DAY |
| Jan 1, 2011 - Dec 31, 2011 |
|  | Sun | Mon | Tue | Wed | Thu | Fri | Sat | Avg |
| 0000-0100 | 30.06 | 24.92 | 24.99 | 23.44 | 24.34 | 28.05 | 27.81 | 26.23 |
| 0100-0200 | 21.59 | 17.97 | 18.64 | 17.92 | 18.70 | 21.07 | 19.96 | 19.41 |
| 0200-0300 | 20.74 | 17.45 | 17.85 | 17.29 | 17.82 | 20.22 | 18.89 | 18.61 |
| 0300-0400 | 20.23 | 17.26 | 17.46 | 17.00 | 17.48 | 19.74 | 18.29 | 18.21 |
| 0400-0500 | 19.85 | 17.00 | 17.13 | 16.71 | 17.01 | 19.36 | 17.97 | 17.86 |
| 0500-0600 | 19.98 | 16.99 | 16.93 | 16.16 | 16.52 | 19.11 | 17.86 | 17.65 |
| 0600-0700 | 26.65 | 22.16 | 20.57 | 18.42 | 19.59 | 23.10 | 24.13 | 22.09 |
| 0700-0800 | 19.56 | 20.56 | 20.90 | 18.69 | 20.11 | 18.43 | 19.16 | 19.63 |
| 0800-0900 | 17.80 | 19.39 | 19.90 | 17.54 | 19.13 | 17.56 | 17.76 | 18.44 |
| 0900-1000 | 17.17 | 19.12 | 19.67 | 17.23 | 18.87 | 17.36 | 17.34 | 18.11 |
| 1000-1100 | 17.00 | 18.95 | 19.67 | 16.96 | 18.87 | 17.25 | 17.18 | 17.98 |
| 1100-1200 | 16.86 | 19.03 | 19.56 | 16.93 | 18.78 | 17.16 | 16.89 | 17.89 |
| 1200-1300 | 16.72 | 18.79 | 19.27 | 16.93 | 18.61 | 17.15 | 16.69 | 17.74 |
| 1300-1400 | 16.69 | 18.98 | 19.22 | 17.09 | 18.73 | 17.16 | 16.68 | 17.79 |
| 1400-1500 | 18.91 | 20.04 | 19.73 | 17.54 | 19.70 | 19.49 | 19.21 | 19.23 |
| 1500-1600 | 28.02 | 28.67 | 27.98 | 26.79 | 29.00 | 29.01 | 29.66 | 28.45 |
| 1600-1700 | 18.68 | 18.65 | 19.25 | 19.41 | 21.03 | 21.84 | 20.90 | 19.97 |
| 1700-1800 | 17.48 | 17.35 | 17.83 | 18.29 | 19.68 | 20.49 | 20.01 | 18.73 |
| 1800-1900 | 17.23 | 17.09 | 17.40 | 17.99 | 19.41 | 19.97 | 19.89 | 18.43 |
| 1900-2000 | 17.13 | 16.98 | 17.26 | 17.93 | 19.20 | 19.81 | 20.21 | 18.36 |
| 2000-2100 | 17.78 | 17.72 | 17.57 | 18.55 | 20.04 | 20.62 | 21.38 | 19.09 |
| 2100-2200 | 27.08 | 26.44 | 24.45 | 23.93 | 27.54 | 28.29 | 31.32 | 27.01 |
| 2200-2300 | 32.22 | 32.29 | 31.25 | 32.38 | 36.70 | 36.22 | 38.18 | 34.18 |
| 2300-2400 | 31.97 | 31.93 | 31.21 | 32.28 | 36.61 | 36.13 | 38.18 | 34.04 |
| Avg | 21.14 | 20.66 | 20.65 | 19.73 | 21.39 | 21.86 | 21.90 | 21.05 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Total Units: | 88.40 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Boxed: Less than 17 |  |  |  |  |  |  |

One major factor that cannot be taken into account through the models is the physical layout of the city being analyzed. While the city of Metropolitan Phoenix, Chandler included, was built on a grid foundation and layout, most cities do no share these convenient qualities. The major streets of Chandler all run North/South and East/West at one-mile junctures, allowing for quick transportation and positioning. Other cities have numerous streets that curve, bend, turn, ox bow, and end abruptly. This causes for a small but essential generalizability problem in the study. It is not enough to discredit the findings or the implications, but it is something to be considered. As for the residential streets, there are many fingered layouts that aesthetically look good in the eyes of a developer, but are detrimental to municipal services. Fingered streets are residential areas where one street is only accessible off one other street, and they figure in that nature into dead ends. This results in much less traffic throughout the neighborhood, but in certain cases it will take an officer (or paramedic, etc.) much longer to drive through the neighborhood and onto the fingered street of choice. This can cause for possible delays in response times for various calls for service and should be included in future studies.

**Future Theoretical Research**

Future research should take into account the various social factors that will undoubtedly affect response time for officers.  There are other indicators of neighborhood disadvantage that were not looked at in this study. Receipt of public assistance, unemployment, female headed-families, density of children, foreign born, (Sampson et al., 1997) physical disorder, other social disorders such as loitering, drinking alcohol in public, gang indicators, presence of drugs, and prostitutes (Sampson and Raudenbush, 1999; Blau & Blau, 1982) could be used to improve the analysis of neighborhood characteristics.

 While only 10% of the overall variance is explained through this study, the findings are still significant to understand implications for future research and policy. That being said, this study has illustrated small trends of calls for service during certain hours of the day, days of the week, months of the year, and in this case, locations in the city. This can be transposed into other cities that share similar demographics. The city of Chandler, Arizona has a population of just over 250,000 people and a police force of over 320 sworn officers. That is approximately 1.28 officers per 1000 residents. Cities with similar police : resident ratios may or may not have similar calls for service demographics and response times.

 This analysis found that 90% of the over variance was not explained by these variables, leaving a large amount of room for speculation and implications. Be it the physical make-up of the city, the underworld societal parameters, or the nature of the topic at hand, the relationship between the police and those whom they have authority over will constantly affect effectiveness. Numerous studies have been conducted, analyzed and explained that cause a need to account for a myriad of parameters for municipal services. This findings show certain areas that have an influx of calls for service compared to other parts of the city. This might mean that those areas need to be more closely monitored to understand why it is that more calls for service are being requested there. The total population of each area can be one reason, but that causes implications of its own. This raises concern for more municipal services, new policies that take into account the differences in population totals and perhaps stricter laws on offenses that occur more often. This is all speculation and much more thought and research must be done in order to recommend policy changes, but with 90% of the variance not explained, there is a very large amount of space to move around.

**Conclusion**

Attitudes toward the legitimacy of the police have varied throughout the historical legacy of its establishment. Throughout the history of the United States, the role of the police has changed in both direction and function. These changes have been sparked by issues dealing with historical context, as well as internal police departmental reformations. Within each profession, lies a subculture, unique in its own way. This subculture, both naturally and socially created and supported, is the main source for police effectiveness. Knowing and understanding the existence of this unique subculture, the police profession attracts a certain kind of person. This person tends to be upright, virtuous, and civic-minded (Skolnick & Fyfe, 1993). Those whose lives encompass this profession will then develop utilities (use of discretion) to maximize efficiency and strengthen the subculture. This use of discretion may play a large role in police effectiveness and efficiency, more specifically with response time. Further studies should take into account the amount of discretion being used by a department and pair that with the response times to various calls for service. This could have further implications as to why certain calls for service has varying response times, holding PRI constant. Judgment calls could be made, knowing the underworld parameters and the relationship between the police and civilians that could essentially have a large effect on police response times.

The findings of this thesis indicate a larger reasoning behind the effects of police response time. With small but significant findings for the structural disadvantage, it is important to determine exactly what it is about structurally disadvantaged neighborhoods that have an effect on police response. Whether the effect is from the officers and the department, or it has to do with the structural makeup of the disadvantaged neighborhoods, or even with the individuals who reside within these neighborhoods, an important finding was established. Perhaps policy has to be altered for structurally disadvantaged neighborhoods for municipal services to affect them similarly to structurally sound neighborhoods. Perhaps it is embedded in the subculture of the policing profession, something that needs to be addressed and changed to better serve the community as a whole. Whatever the cause, future research should further investigate the resulted findings in this thesis and establish a better understanding of why structurally disadvantaged neighborhoods affect police response time.

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APPENDIX A

MODEL 1 REGRESSION

|  |
| --- |
| COEFFICIENTS |
| Model | Unstandardized Coefficients | Standardized Coefficients | t | Sig. |
| B | Std. Error | Beta |
|  | (Constant) | 40.960 | .447 |   | 91.548 | 0.000 |
| PRI | -10.410 | .244 | -.310 | -42.746 | 0.000 |
| a. Dependent Variable: Response time |

|  |
| --- |
| MODEL SUMMARY |
| Model | R | R Square | Adjusted R Square | Std. Error of the Estimate |
| 1 | .310a | .096 | .096 | 29.15569 |
| a. Predictors: (Constant), PRI |

APPENDIX B

MODEL 2 REGRESSION

|  |
| --- |
| COEFFICIENT**S** |
| Model | Unstandardized Coefficients | Standardized Coefficients | t | Sig. |
| B | Std. Error | Beta |
|  | (Constant) | 32.165 | .840 |   | 38.287 | .000 |
| Felony crime (yes/no) | -1.422 | .558 | -.021 | -2.550 | .011 |
| Disorder incident (yes/no) | 7.217 | .748 | .091 | 9.643 | .000 |
| Violent crime (yes/no) | -6.548 | .612 | -.103 | -10.705 | .000 |
| in progress, just occurred, or a report of a past event? | -12.030 | .510 | -.220 | -23.590 | .000 |
| Did this call come from an apartment building? | -.995 | .544 | -.013 | -1.828 | .068 |
| At about what time of day did the call occur? | -.943 | .325 | -.023 | -2.900 | .004 |
| Did the call occur on a weekend day? | -2.846 | .457 | -.046 | -6.225 | .000 |
| What season did the call occur in? | -.204 | .201 | -.007 | -1.017 | .309 |
| Did the call occur in a crime hot spot? | 3.796 | .476 | .058 | 7.976 | .000 |
| Volume of call activity on that particular day and hour | 1.014 | .125 | .060 | 8.089 | .000 |
| a. Dependent Variable: Response time  |

|  |
| --- |
| MODEL SUMMARY |
| Model | R | R Square | Adjusted R Square | Std. Error of the Estimate |
| 1 | .306a | .094 | .093 | 29.20529 |
| a. Predictors: (Constant), Volume of call activity, season, hot spot?, Violent crime?, apartment building?, weekend day?, Felony crime?, time of day?, in progress, just occurred, or a report of a past event?, Disorder incident?  |

APPENDIX C

MODEL 3 REGRESSION

|  |
| --- |
| COEFFICIENTS |
| Model | Unstandardized Coefficients | Standardized Coefficients | t | Sig. |
| B | Std. Error | Beta |
|  | (Constant) | 32.089 | .855 |   | 37.523 | .000 |
| Felony crime (yes/no) | -1.366 | .565 | -.020 | -2.419 | .016 |
| Disorder incident (yes/no) | 7.155 | .758 | .090 | 9.445 | .000 |
| Violent crime (yes/no) | -6.671 | .618 | -.106 | -10.786 | .000 |
| In progress, just occurred, or a report of a past event? | -12.037 | .514 | -.221 | -23.400 | .000 |
| Did this call come from an apartment building? | -1.075 | .551 | -.015 | -1.952 | .051 |
| At about what time of day did the call occur? | -.871 | .329 | -.022 | -2.646 | .008 |
| Did the call occur on a weekend day? | -2.860 | .462 | -.047 | -6.185 | .000 |
| What season did the call occur in? | -.152 | .203 | -.006 | -.750 | .454 |
| Did the call occur in a crime hot spot? | 3.316 | .492 | .051 | 6.736 | .000 |
| Volume of call activity on that particular day and hour | 1.017 | .127 | .061 | 8.007 | .000 |
| Minority concentration  | .323 | .230 | .011 | 1.404 | .160 |
| Structural disadvantage  | .588 | .230 | .019 | 2.560 | .010 |
| a. Dependent Variable: Response time |

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  |  | MODEL SUMMARY |  |  |
| Model | R | R Square | Adjusted R Square | Std. Error of the Estimate |
| 1 | .308a | .095 | .094 | 29.08869 |
| a. Predictors: (Constant), Structural disadvantage, Minority concentration, season?, weekend day?, Violent crime?. Volume of call activity, apartment building?, Felony crime?, hot spot?, time of day?, In progress, just occurred, or a report of a past event?, Disorder incident? |

APPENDIX D

FACTOR ANALYSIS INCLUDING ALL SEVEN LEVEL-2 VARIABLES

|  |
| --- |
| TOT VARIANCE EXPLAINED |
| Component | Initial Eigenvalues | Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings | Rotation Sums of Squared Loadings |
| Total | % of Variance | Cumulative % | Total | % of Variance | Cumulative % | Total | % of Variance | Cumulative % |
| 1 | 3.647 | 52.095 | 52.095 | 3.647 | 52.095 | 52.095 | 2.686 | 38.374 | 38.374 |
| 2 | 1.542 | 22.029 | 74.125 | 1.542 | 22.029 | 74.125 | 2.503 | 35.750 | 74.125 |
| 3 | .656 | 9.365 | 83.489 |   |   |   |   |   |   |
| 4 | .529 | 7.552 | 91.042 |   |   |   |   |   |   |
| 5 | .290 | 4.147 | 95.188 |   |   |   |   |   |   |
| 6 | .254 | 3.630 | 98.818 |   |   |   |   |   |   |
| 7 | .083 | 1.182 | 100.000 |   |   |   |   |   |   |
| Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. |

|  |
| --- |
| ROTATEDCOMPONENTMATRIX |
|   | Component |
| 1 | 2 |
| Percent Hispanic | .864 | .387 |
| Percent Asian | -.835 | .279 |
| Percent White | -.751 | -.198 |
| Percent Poverty | .717 | .578 |
| Percent Black | .063 | .826 |
| Percent Renter | .401 | .800 |
| Population Density | .015 | .761 |
| Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.  Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. |
| a. Rotation converged in 3 iterations. |

APPENDIX E

SCREE PLOT OF FACTOR ANALYSIS



APPENDIX F

FACTOR ANALYSIS INCLUDING ONLY THREE MINORITY CONCENTRATION VARIABLES

|  |
| --- |
| TOTAL VARIANCE EXPLAINED |
| Component | Initial Eigenvalues | Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings |
| Total | % of Variance | Cumulative % | Total | % of Variance | Cumulative % |
| 1 | 1.948 | 64.929 | 64.929 | 1.948 | 64.929 | 64.929 |
| 2 | .599 | 19.975 | 84.904 |   |   |   |
| 3 | .453 | 15.096 | 100.000 |   |   |   |
| Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. |

|  |
| --- |
| COMPONENT MATRIX |
|   | Component |
| 1 |
| Percent Hispanic | -.838 |
| Percent Asian | .812 |
| Percent White | .765 |
| Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. |
|  |

APPENDIX G

FACTOR ANALYSIS INCLUDING ONLY FOUR STRUCTURAL DISADVANTAGE VARIABLES

|  |
| --- |
| TOTAL VARIANCE EXPLAINED |
| Component | Initial Eigenvalues | Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings |
| Total | % of Variance | Cumulative % | Total | % of Variance | Cumulative % |
| 1 | 2.624 | 65.612 | 65.612 | 2.624 | 65.612 | 65.612 |
| 2 | .639 | 15.974 | 81.586 |   |   |   |
| 3 | .494 | 12.343 | 93.929 |   |   |   |
| 4 | .243 | 6.071 | 100.000 |   |   |   |
| Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. |

|  |
| --- |
| COMPONENT MATRIX |
|   | Component |
| 1 |
| Percent Renter | .902 |
| Percent Poverty | .816 |
| Percent Black | .806 |
| Population Density | .705 |
| Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. |
| . |

APPENDIX H

MAP OF CHANDLER BY POLICE BEATS

